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Abstract
We propose a setting for two-phase opinion dy-
namics in social networks, where the final opin-
ion of a node in the first phase acts as its initial
biased opinion in the second phase. In this set-
ting, we study the problem of two camps aiming to
maximize adoption of their respective opinions by
strategically investing on nodes, where the effec-
tiveness of a camp’s investment on a node depends
on the node’s initial bias. We propose an exten-
sion of Friedkin-Johnsen model for our setting, and
hence formulate the utility functions of the camps.
For the non-competitive case where only one camp
invests, we present a polynomial time algorithm for
determining an optimal way to split the camp’s bud-
get between the two phases. For the case of com-
peting camps, we show the existence of Nash equi-
libria under reasonable assumptions, and that they
can be computed in polynomial time. Our main
conclusion is that, if nodes attribute high weightage
to their initial biases, it is advantageous to have a
high investment in the first phase, so as to exploit
the manipulated biases in the second phase.
1 Introduction
Studying opinion dynamics in a society is important to under-
stand and influence elections, viral marketing, propagation of
ideas and behaviors, etc. In this paper, we consider two camps
who aim to maximize the adoption of their respective opin-
ions in a social network. We consider a strict competition in
the space of real-valued opinions, where one camp aims to
drive the overall opinion of the network towards being pos-
itive while the other camp aims to drive it towards negative;
we refer to them as good and bad camps respectively. We con-
sider a well-accepted quantification of the overall opinion of
a network: the average or equivalently, sum of opinion values
of nodes [Gionis et al., 2013; Grabisch et al., 2018]. Hence
the good and bad camps simultaneously aim to respectively
maximize and minimize this sum.
The average or sum of opinion values is of relevance in
several applications, e.g., fund collection where the magni-
tude of a node’s opinion value corresponds to the amount and
the sign indicates the camp towards which it is willing to con-
tribute. Another example is when nodes are reporting agents
on social media, where a node’s opinion corresponds to its
reported intensity of an event based on the information it re-
ceives; this information could be influenced by the camps.
In such scenarios, the opinion value of a node would be a
real-valued number, and the sum or average of opinion values
would be the overall opinion of the network.
Social networks play a prime role in determining the opin-
ions of constituent nodes, since nodes usually update their
opinions based on the opinions of their connections [Easley
and Kleinberg, 2010; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011]. This
fact is exploited by camps; they determine influential nodes
to invest on in the form of money, free products, convincing
discussions, etc., so as to drive these nodes’ opinions in their
favor. Thus given a budget constraint, the strategy of a camp
comprises of how much to invest on each node, in presence
of a competing camp who also would invest strategically.
1.1 Motivation
In the popular model by Friedkin and Johnsen [1990, 1997],
every node holds an initial bias in opinion. It could have
formed owing to the node’s fundamental views, experiences,
mass media exposure, opinion dynamics in the past, etc. This
initial bias plays an important role in determining a node’s
final opinion, and consequently the opinions of its neighbors
and hence that of its neighbors’ neighbors and so on. If nodes
give significant weightage to their biases, the camps would
want to manipulate these biases. This could be achieved by
campaigning in multiple phases, wherein the opinion at the
conclusion of a phase would act as the initial biased opinion
for the next phase. Such campaigning is often used during
elections and marketing, to gradually drive nodes’ opinions.
The initial bias of a node often impacts the effectiveness of
camps’ investments on that node. For instance, if the initial
bias of a node is positive, the investment made by the good
camp is likely to be more effective on it than that made by
the bad camp. The reasoning is similar to that of the bounded
confidence model [Krause, 2000], where a node pays more
attention to opinions that do not differ too much from its own
opinion. Since a camp’s effectiveness depends on the nodes’
biases, its investment in the first phase not only manipulates
the biases for getting a head start in the second phase, but also
the effectiveness of its investment in the second phase.
With the possibility of campaigning in two phases, a camp
could not only decide which nodes to invest on, but also how
to split its available budget between the two phases.
1.2 Related Work
Several models of opinion dynamics have been proposed in
the literature [Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011; Lorenz, 2007],
some noteworthy ones being DeGroot [DeGroot, 1974], Voter
[Holley and Liggett, 1975], Friedkin-Johnsen [Friedkin and
Johnsen, 1990, 1997], bounded confidence [Krause, 2000],
etc. In Friedkin-Johnsen model, each node updates its opin-
ion using a weighted combination of its initial bias and its
neighbors’ opinions. We generalize this model to multiple
phases, while also accounting for the camps’ investments.
Problems related to determining influential nodes in social
networks have been extensively studied [Guille et al., 2013;
Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Kempe et al., 2003; Gionis et
al., 2013]. For instance, Yildiz et al. [2013] study the prob-
lem of optimal placement of stubborn nodes (whose opinion
values stay unchanged) in the discrete binary opinions set-
ting. There also have been game theoretic studies [Ghaderi
and Srikant, 2014; Anagnostopoulos et al., 2015; Bharathi et
al., 2007]. Specific to analytically tractable models such as
DeGroot, there have been studies in the competitive setting to
identify influential nodes and the amounts to be invested on
them [Dubey et al., 2006; Bimpikis et al., 2016; Grabisch et
al., 2018]. Our work extends these studies to two phases, by
identifying influential nodes in the two phases and how much
they should be invested on in each phase.
There have been a few studies on adaptive selection of in-
fluential nodes for opinion diffusion in multiple phases [See-
man and Singer, 2013; Rubinstein et al., 2015; Horel and
Singer, 2015; Correa et al., 2015; Badanidiyuru et al., 2016;
Tong et al., 2016; Yuan and Tang, 2017]. Singer [2016]
presents a survey of such adaptive methodologies. Dhamal
et al. [2016] empirically study the problem of optimally split-
ting the available budget between two phases, which has been
extended to multiple phases by Dhamal [2018]. While the
reasoning behind using multiple phases in these studies is
adaptation of strategy based on previous observations, we aim
to use multiple phases for manipulating the initial biases of
nodes, which requires a very different analytical treatment.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an ana-
lytical study on a rich model such as Friedkin-Johnsen, for
opinion dynamics in two phases (not even for single camp).
The most relevant to this study is our work in [Dhamal et
al., 2018] where, however, a camp’s influence on a node is
assumed to be independent of the node’s bias.
1.3 Our Contributions
• We formulate the two-phase objective function under
Friedkin-Johnsen model, where a node’s final opinion in
the first phase acts as its initial bias for the second phase,
and the effectiveness of a camp’s influence on the node
depends on this initial bias.
• For the non-competitive case, we develop a polynomial
time algorithm for determining an optimal way to split a
camp’s budget between the two phases.
• For the case of two competing camps, we show the exis-
tence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions,
and that they can be computed in polynomial time.
2 Our Model
Given a social network, let N be the set of nodes and E be
the set of weighted directed edges. Let n = |N |. The weights
could hold any sign, since the influences could be positive
or negative [Altafini, 2013]. Our model can be viewed as a
multiphase extension of [Dhamal et al., 2017].
2.1 Parameters
As our opinion dynamics runs in two phases, most parameters
have two values, one for each phase. For such parameters, we
denote its value corresponding to phase p using superscript
(p), where p = 1, 2 for first and second phase, respectively.
Initial Bias. Every node i holds an initial bias in opinion prior
to the opinion dynamics process; we denote it by v0i ∈ R. In
the multiphase setting, this acts as the initial bias for the first
phase. We denote the opinion value of node i at the conclu-
sion of phase 1 by v(1)i . This acts as its initial bias for phase 2.
So by convention, we have v(0)i = v
0
i . We denote the weigh-
tage that node i attributes to its initial bias by w0ii.
Network Effect. Let wij be the weightage attributed by
node i to the opinion of its connection j. Consistent with
Friedkin-Johnsen model, we assume the influence on node i
owing to node j in phase p, to bewijv
(p)
j . So the net influence





Weightage to Campaigning. We denote the weightage that
node i attributes to the good and bad campaigning in phase p
byw(p)ig andw
(p)
ib , respectively. Since we consider that the ini-
tial bias of a node impacts the effectiveness of camps’ invest-




ib . Note that
w0ii would also play a role since it quantifies the weightage
given by node i to its initial bias. We hence propose a model
on this line, whereinw(p)ig is a monotone non-decreasing func-
tion of w0iiv
(p−1)
i , and w
(p)
ib is a monotone non-increasing
function of w0iiv
(p−1)
i . Let node i attribute a total of θi to
the influence weights of the camps, that is, w(p)ig +w
(p)
ib = θi.


















Camp Investments. The good and bad camps attempt to di-
rectly influence the nodes so that their opinions are pulled
towards being positive and negative respectively. We denote
the investments made by the good and bad camps on node i in






i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N
for p = 1, 2). Since the influence of good camp (+ve opin-
ion) on node i in phase p would be an increasing function of
both x(p)i and w
(p)





(maintaining the linearity of Friedkin-Johnsen model). Sim-
ilarly, −w(p)ib y
(p)
i is the influence of bad camp (−ve opinion)
on node i in phase p. Let kg and kb be the respective budgets
of the good and bad camps. Hence the camps should invest











i ) ≤ kb.
Weight Constraints. Friedkin-Johnsen model has the fol-
lowing condition on influence weights:
∀i ∈ N : |w0ii|+
∑
j∈N
|wij | ≤ 1
Since the model follows an opinion update rule (as we see
later), convergence is an important factor. A standard as-
sumption for guaranteeing convergence is∑
j∈N
|wij | < 1
This condition is usually enforced to ensure convergence. In
our setting, this condition is natural and well suited, since we
would have non-zero weights attributed to bias (w0ii).
Matrix Forms. Let W be the matrix consisting of weights
wij for each pair of nodes (i, j). Let v0, w0, Θ, wg(p),
wb













i , respectively. Let oper-
ation ◦ denote Hadamard vector product, i.e., (a◦b)i = aibi.
2.2 Opinion Update Rule





j∈N wijvj . Extending to multiple phases, the up-





j . Accounting for camps’ investments, we get



















In phase p, the vectors x(p),y(p),v(p−1) stay unchanged;
the weights wg(p),wb(p) (which depend on v(p−1)) and w0
also stay unchanged; while v(p) gets updated. Hence, writing






0 ◦ v(p−1) + wg(p) ◦ x(p) −wb(p) ◦ y(p)













Now, the initial bias for phase p : v(p)〈0〉 = v
(p−1). Also, W
is strictly substochastic (sum of each row strictly less than 1);
its spectral radius is less than 1. So when τ → ∞, we have
limτ→∞W
τ = 0 and limτ→∞
∑τ−1
η=0 W
η = (I −W)−1







which is a constant vector. So the dynamics in phase p con-
verges to the steady state
v(p) =(I−W)−1(w0◦v(p−1)+wg(p)◦x(p)−wb(p)◦y(p)) (3)





i , the sum of nodes’ opinions at the
end of phase p ∈ {1, 2}. Premultiplying (3) by 1T gives
1Tv(p) = 1T (I−W)−1(w0 ◦ v(p−1) + wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p))
Let ∆ = (I −W)−1 and rT = 1T (I −W)−1, that is,
ri =
∑
j∈N ∆ji. Since ∆ =
∑∞
η=0 W
η , we have that ∆ji is
the influence that j receives from i through walks of all pos-
sible lengths. So ri =
∑
j∈N ∆ji can be viewed as overall






































































































































































































Here (x(1),x(2)) is the strategy of the good camp
for the two phases, and (y(1),y(2)) is the strategy of











be the bad camp’s utility. The good camp aims to maximize
















































The game can thus be viewed as a two-player zero-sum
game, where the players determine their investment strate-
gies (x(1),x(2)) and (y(1),y(2)); the good camp invests as
per x(1) in the first phase and as per x(2) in the second phase,
and the bad camp invests as per y(1) in the first phase and as
per y(2) in the second phase. Our objective essentially is to
find the Nash equilibrium strategies of the two camps.
First we consider a simplified yet interesting (and not-yet-
studied-in-literature) case where budget of one of the camps
is 0 (say kb = 0); so effectively we have only the good camp.
3 The Non-Competitive Case





We saw that ri =
∑
j∈N ∆ji indicates the influencing power
of node i. Now, bji = ∆jiw0jjrj quantifies the overall influ-
ence ∆ji of i on j, which would give weightagew0jj to its ini-
tial opinion in the next phase, and have an influencing power
of rj in the next phase. Hence bji can be interpreted as the
influence of node i on the network through node j, looking
one phase ahead. So
∑
j∈N bji can be viewed as the overall
influencing power of node i, looking one phase ahead. We
denote si =
∑
j∈N bji and identify its role in our analysis.
For non-competitive case, we have y(1)i =y
(2)
i =0,∀i ∈ N


















































































































i (ci + 1)
)
(9)




i is a bi-
linear function in x(1) and x(2), we prove our next result.





first and second phase investments, respectively. Our method
of finding optimal k(1)g and k
(2)
g is to first search for them in
the search space k(1)g + k
(2)
g ∈ (0, kg] and then compare the














Proposition 1. In the search space k(1)g + k(2)g ∈ (0, kg], it is
optimal for good camp to exhaust entire budget (k(1)g +k
(2)
g =
kg), and to invest on at most one node in each phase.
Proof. Given any x(2), Expression (8) can be maximized




j to a sin-











if this value is positive. In case of multiple such nodes, one
node can be chosen at random. If this value is non-positive
for all nodes, it is optimal to have x(1) = 0. When x(1) = 0,
Expression (9) now implies that it is optimal to allocate the
entire budget kg in second phase to a single node j that
maximizes θj2
(∑
i∈N bjici + rj
)
, if this value is positive. If
this value is non-positive for all nodes, it is optimal to have
x(2) = 0. This is the case where starting with an x(2), we





a single node in first phase, or invest the entire budget kg on
a single node in second phase, or invest in neither phase.
Similarly using (9), starting with a given x(1), we can con-





single node in the second phase, or invest the entire kg on a
single node in the first phase, or invest in neither phase.
So starting from any x(1) or x(2), we can iteratively im-
prove (need not be strictly) on the value of (7) by investing
on at most one node in a given phase. Furthermore, it is sub-
optimal to have k(1)g +k
(2)





So there exist optimal vectors x(1) and x(2) that maximize








i 6=α = x
(2)
j 6=β = 0.
Now the next step is to find nodes α and β that maximize (7).
























































































g bβα(cα + 1) (10)
Now, for a given pair (α, β), we will find the optimal val-
ues of k(1)g and k
(2)
g from (10). From Proposition 1, we have
k
(2)






































i∈N bβici + rβ
θαbβα(cα + 1)
A valid value of k(1)g can be obtained only if the denominators
in above expression are non-zero. However, a zero denom-
inator would mean that Expression (10) is linear, resulting
in only two possibilities of k(1)g , namely, 0 or kg . Also, if
the second derivative with respect to k(1)g is positive, that is,
−θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(w0ααv0α+1)>0, optimal k
(1)
g is either 0 or




since k(1)g is bounded in [0, kg], optimal k
(1)
g for pair (α, β) is
(since ci = w0iiv
0























































When we assumed k(1)g and k
(2)
g to be fixed, we had to iter-
ate through all (α, β) pairs to determine the one that gives the
optimal value of Expression (10). Now, whenever we look at
an (α, β) pair, we can determine the corresponding optimal
values of k(1)g and k
(2)
g using (11) and (12), and hence deter-





g and that (α, β) pair. The optimal pair (α, β) can
thus be obtained as the pair that maximizes (10).
Above analysis holds when k(1)g +k
(2)
g = kg . From Propo-
sition 1, we need to consider one more possibility that k(1)g =
k
(2)





for Expression (10). Let (0, 0) correspond to this additional
possibility. It is hence optimal to invest k(1)g (obtained using
(11)) on node α in the first phase and k(2)g (obtained using





j∈N cibji to Expression (10).
Since we iterate through (n2 + 1) possibilities (namely,
(α, β) ∈ N × N ∪ {(0, 0)}), the above procedure gives a
polynomial time algorithm for determining the optimal bud-
get split and the optimal investments on nodes in two phases.
Remark 1. For non-negative values of parameters, (11) indi-
cates that for a given (α, β) pair, the good camp would want
to invest more in the first phase for a higher sα. This is intu-
itive from our understanding of sα being viewed as the influ-
encing power of node α looking one phase ahead. Similarly,
(12) indicates that it would want to invest more in second
phase for a higher rβ , since rβ can be viewed as the influ-
encing power of node β in the immediate phase. Also, (11)
and (12) indicate that a higher θα drives the camp to invest
in first phase and a higher θβ drives it to invest in second
phase. Since wig is an increasing function of θi, this implic-
itly means that a node with a higherwig drives the good camp
to invest in the phase in which that node is selected. Further,
we illustrate the role of w0ii using simulations in Section 5.
4 The Case of Competing Camps





multilinear function in this case also, since it can be written
as a linear function in x(1),y(1),x(2),y(2) separately. The
following proposition can be hence proved on similar lines.
Proposition 2. In the search space k(1)g + k(2)g ∈ (0, kg],
it is optimal for good camp to have k(1)g + k
(2)
g = kg , and










b = kb, and invest on at most one node in each phase.
Denoting w0iiv
0
i = ci, rjw
0
jj∆ji = bji, si =
∑
j∈N bji as

























































































From Proposition 2, there exist optimal vectors x(1),x(2)
for good camp and optimal vectors y(1),y(2) for bad camp,

















i 6=α = x
(2)




j 6=δ = 0. Assuming such profile of












































































First, we consider the case when k(1)g + k
(2)
g = kg
and k(1)b + k
(2)
b = kb. Now, for a given profile of









b . In this case, we have k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g
and k(2)b = kb − k
(1)


















we get k(1)g equal to (letting A = θγθδ(1 − cγ)bδγ and





























We can similarly obtain k(1)b . If second derivative w.r.t.
k
(1)
g , i.e., −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1 + w0ααv0α) < 0 and that w.r.t.
k
(1)
b , i.e., θγθδrδw
0
δδ∆δγ(1 − w0γγv0γ) > 0, and the obtained
solution is such that k(1)g ∈ [0, kg] and k(1)b ∈ [0, kb], then nei-










So we can effectively write ug((x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))) as
ug((α, β), (γ, δ)), where ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) is the value of∑
i∈N v
(2)
i , which corresponds to the strategy profile where





g ), and bad camp invests on nodes (γ, δ) with opti-
mal budget split (k(1)b , k
(2)
b ).
For general case where the solution k(1)g , k
(1)
b obtained
above may not satisfy k(1)g ∈ [0, kg] and k(1)b ∈ [0, kb], we
make a practically reasonable assumption so as to determine
ug((α, β), (γ, δ)). It is easy to show that if wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j),
then ∆ij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and ri ≥ 1,∀i ∈ N . So if we assume
wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, v0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ N ,
we would have that −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1 + w0ααv0α) ≤ 0 and
θγθδrδw
0
δδ∆δγ(1 − w0γγv0γ) ≥ 0. That is, we would have∑
i∈N v
(2)
i to be a convex-concave function, which is con-
cave w.r.t. k(1)g and convex w.r.t. k
(1)
b . So in the domain




b ) such that, neither















i to ug((α, β), (γ, δ)).
Thus using above technique, we obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ))





b =kb. From Proposition 2, the only other cases
to consider are k(1)b = k
(2)




g = 0. Let the
profile ((α, β), (0, 0)) correspond to k(1)b = k
(2)
b = 0. Note
that when k(1)b =k
(2)
b = 0, it reduces to non-competitive case





an (α, β) pair can hence be assigned to ug((α, β), (0, 0)).
Thus we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of nodes
((α, β), (0, 0)). Similarly, we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ))
for all profiles of nodes ((0, 0), (γ, δ)). And from Equation





So we have that the good camp has (n2 + 1) possible pure
strategies to choose from, namely, (α, β) ∈ N×N∪{(0, 0)}.
Similarly, the bad camp has (n2 + 1) possible pure strategies
to choose from, namely, (γ, δ) ∈ N × N ∪ {(0, 0)}. We
thus have a two-player zero-sum game, for which the utili-
ties of the players can be computed for each strategy profile
((α, β), (γ, δ)) as explained above. Though we cannot ensure
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the finite-
ness of the number of strategies ensures the existence of a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Further, owing to it being a
two-player zero-sum game, the Nash equilibria can be found
efficiently by solving a linear program [Osborne, 2004].
Summarizing, under practically reasonable assumptions
(wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, v0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i ∈ N ),
we transformed the problem into a two-player zero-sum game
with each player having (n2 + 1) pure strategies, and showed
how the players’ utilities can be computed for each strategy
profile. We thus deduced the existence of Nash equilibria and
that they can be found efficiently using linear programming.
5 Simulations and Results
For determining implications of our analytical results on
real-world networks, we conducted simulations on NetHEPT
(15,233 nodes, 31,376 edges): a dataset widely used for ex-
perimental justifications in the literature on opinion diffusion
[Kempe et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2009, 2010]. We present our
results for the non-competitive case. We point that though we
presented a polynomial time algorithm for two camps, which
is of theoretical interest, it is computationally expensive to
run on networks larger than a few hundred nodes. It is hence
worth exploring the possibility of a more efficient algorithm.
Setup. We assume the value of w0ii to be same for all
nodes, in order to study the effect of this value. The range
of values we consider for w0ii is {0, 0.05, . . . , 0.95}. Let
N(i) be the set of i’s neighbors. We model the influence


























Figure 1: Illustration of the effect of w0ii (NetHEPT) with kg = 100
weights as follows. For a given w0ii, we consider θi > 0 and
wij≥ 0,∀j∈N(i) such that the weights for any node i sum to
1, i.e., θi+
∑
j∈N(i)wij=1−w0ii. For different values ofw0ii,
the values of θi and wij are scaled proportional to (1−w0ii).
We consider v0i = 0,∀i ∈ N to start with a neutral network,
for reliably studying the effects of critical parameters ri, w0ii,













Results. Figure 1 presents the optimal budget that should be
allotted for first phase as a function ofw0ii. In our simulations,
the optimal values obtained are such that k(2)g = kg−k(1)g .
For low values of w0ii, the optimal strategy is to invest almost
entirely in second phase. This is because the effect of first
phase diminishes in second phase when w0ii is low. Remark 1
states that high sj value (influencing power of j looking one
phase ahead) would attract more investment in first phase.




ii∆ij would be significant only if
j influences nodes i with significant values of w0ii. With low
w0ii, we are less likely to have node j with high value of sj
since it requires it to be influential towards significant num-
ber of nodes iwith significant values ofw0ii. Hence allotting a
significant budget for first phase would be advantageous only
if we have nodes with significant value of w0ii.
We considered v0i = 0,∀i ∈ N in above simulations, how-
ever, we also observed the effects of v0i 6= 0 (initially biased
network); the nature of plot remains similar to Figure 1 with
subtle differences. If v0i ’s are mostly positive, the good camp
invests less in first phase, mainly because v0i ’s already give a
good head start to have a healthy value at the end of first phase
(which is bias for second phase), and the budget could rather
be invested in second phase. If v0i ’s are mostly negative, it
invests more in first phase to nullify the initial disadvantage.
6 Conclusion
Using Friedkin-Johnsen model, we proposed a framework for
two-phase investment on nodes in a social network, where a
node’s opinion in first phase acts as its bias in second phase,
and the effectiveness of a camp’s investment depends on this
bias. For one investing camp, we derived polynomial time
algorithm for determining optimal budget split between two
phases. Our simulations quantified the impact of the weigh-
tage that nodes attribute to their biases; a high weightage ne-
cessitated high investment in first phase, so that the manipu-
lated biases could be harnessed in second phase. For compet-
ing camps, we showed existence of Nash equilibria under rea-
sonable assumptions (wij≥0,∀(i, j) and w0ii≥0, θi≥0, v0i ∈
[−1,1],∀i ∈ N ) and their polynomial time computability.
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